Power, points, and turns may represent different dynamics depending on the narrative framework of the simulation. Please use your imagination.
The simulation is played over a limited number of turns. Points are distributed equally and periodically among participants. Each participant must decide how to allocate their points, whether to cooperate with others to gain additional points, or whether to compete against others to reduce their accumulated points. Strategic decision-making is required to maximize outcomes before the final turn ends.
1. Allocation
Each actor must distribute 100% of their turn points among the available policy items.
Within each item, allocation may be used for Cooperation %, Competition %, or left as base allocation.
Cooperation % = cooperative investment. Competition % = defensive capacity and, when conditions are met, attack capacity.
If a participant assigns 0% to both cooperation and competition, the item still contributes its base allocation value, but generates no cooperative or competitive effects.
The sum Coop% + Comp% must be ≤ 100%:
If it is less than 100%, the remainder stays as base allocation.
If it is greater than 100%, the move is invalid and the previous turn’s move is taken as valid instead.
Example: A participant has 100 points this turn. They allocate 60% to “Economy” and 40% to “Environment”. That is valid because the total allocation is 100%.
If instead they allocate 80% to “Economy” and 30% to “Environment”, the move exceeds 100% and is invalid.
Allocation points are recorded as mov_alloc.
2. Cooperation
Cooperation points depend on the outcome mov_coop = mov_alloc × coop%.
Cooperation is only activated if three conditions are met:
The participant assigns Coop > 0 in that item.
There is at least one other participant within the declared cooperation range, based on accumulated item points from the previous turn.
That other participant also assigns Coop > 0 in the same item and includes the first participant within their own cooperation range.
In short: reciprocity is required.
If there is no reciprocity, res_coop = 0.
Distribution formula:
A common pool is created by summing all valid cooperative contributions among cooperating participants.
This pool is divided equally among all valid cooperative participants.
Each participant then receives: res_coop = pool ÷ number of participants + own contribution × bonus_coop.
The cooperation bonus is defined in the simulation settings.
Example: Participant A and Participant B both cooperate on “Environment”, each investing 20 points.
Together they form a cooperation group. The pool is 40 points.
Each receives 20 points from the pool, plus their own cooperation bonus.
If Participant B had not reciprocated, Participant A’s 20 cooperation points would generate no cooperative result.
3. Competition = Defense / Attack
Competition points depend on the outcome mov_comp = mov_alloc × comp%.
By default, mov_comp counts as defense, useful to resist attacks.
Competition becomes an attack only if:
The participant declares a valid attack range, and
There is at least one target within that range, based on accumulated item points from the previous turn.
If no targets are within the declared range, no attack occurs and no malus is applied.
The competition malus is defined in the simulation settings.
If two or more targets fall within the range, the attack points are divided equally among all valid targets.
Example: Participant A allocates 40 points to competition in “Defense” and declares an attack on participants with 100–150 defense points.
Participant B has 120 points and is in range. Participant C has 90 points and is not in range.
Only Participant B is attacked with 40 points.
If both B and C were in range, each would be attacked with 20 points.
4. Malus and Damage
If an attack takes place:
The attacker always pays a malus = mov_comp × malus_attack, applied once even if attacking multiple defenders.
For each defender:
The defender’s defense equals their mov_comp in that item during the current turn.
Attack power is compared against defense.
If attack > defense, the defender suffers damage = attack per target - defense.
If attack ≤ defense, the attack fails. The defender takes no damage, but the attacker still pays the malus.
Example: Participant A attacks Participant B with 30 points. Participant B has 20 defense points.
The attack succeeds. Participant B loses 10 points. Participant A also pays the malus.
If Participant B had 40 defense points, the attack would fail. Participant B would lose nothing, but Participant A would still pay the malus.